Francisella tularensis Transmission by Solid Organ Transplantation, 20171. by Nelson, Christina A et al.
UC Davis
UC Davis Previously Published Works
Title
Francisella tularensis Transmission by Solid Organ Transplantation, 20171.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7cw1n986
Journal
Emerging infectious diseases, 25(4)
ISSN
1080-6059
Authors
Nelson, Christina A
Murua, Christian
Jones, Jefferson M
et al.
Publication Date
2019-04-17
DOI
10.3201/eid2504.181807
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
In July 2017, fever and sepsis developed in 3 recipients of 
solid organs (1 heart and 2 kidneys) from a common donor 
in the United States; 1 of the kidney recipients died. Tulare-
mia was suspected only after blood cultures from the sur-
viving kidney recipient grew Francisella species. The organ 
donor, a middle-aged man from the southwestern United 
States, had been hospitalized for acute alcohol withdrawal 
syndrome, pneumonia, and multiorgan failure. F. tularensis 
subsp. tularensis (clade A2) was cultured from archived 
spleen tissue from the donor and blood from both kidney 
recipients. Whole-genome multilocus sequence typing indi-
cated that the isolated strains were indistinguishable. The 
heart recipient remained seronegative with negative blood 
cultures but had been receiving antimicrobial drugs for a 
medical device infection before transplant. Two lagomorph 
carcasses collected near the donor’s residence were posi-
tive by PCR for F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2). 
This investigation documents F. tularensis transmission by 
solid organ transplantation.
Tularemia, also known as rabbit fever, is a zoonotic disease caused by the gram-negative bacterium Fran-
cisella tularensis. Natural transmission to humans occurs 
through a variety of routes, including tick and deerfly bites, 
direct handling of infected tissues, ingestion of contami-
nated water or tissues, or inhalation of infective materials 
(1). Tularemia occurs throughout the northern hemisphere 
in every US state except Hawaii. Each year in the United 
States, ≈120 cases are reported (2).
F. tularensis is a Tier 1 bioterrorism threat because of 
its low infective dose, ability to aerosolize, and history of 
development as a bioterrorism agent. Several countries have 
studied this organism or developed it as a bioweapon (3,4). 
F. tularensis has also caused laboratory-acquired infections 
(5); therefore, laboratory personnel must take specific 
precautionary measures when handling clinical isolates (6).
Clinical manifestations of F. tularensis infection de-
pend on route of exposure. Ulceroglandular and glandu-
lar tularemia, characterized by fever and tender regional 
lymphadenopathy, are the most common forms and typi-
cally follow inoculation of the skin. Pneumonic tularemia, 
the most lethal form, results from inhalation of F. tularen-
sis or hematogenous spread from local infection. Pneumon-
ic tularemia typically produces fever, chest pain, shortness 
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of breath, and variable radiographic findings. Oropharyn-
geal, oculoglandular, and typhoidal tularemia occur less 
frequently (7). The drugs typically recommended for treat-
ment of tularemia are streptomycin, gentamicin, ciproflox-
acin, or doxycycline (4).
In July 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) was notified that blood cultures from 2 
solid organ transplant recipients in different US states, both of 
whom had sepsis, yielded a small, gram-negative organism 
suspected to be F. tularensis. The 2 recipients shared a 
common organ donor, prompting a collaborative public health 
investigation to characterize the source of transmission.
Patients
Transplant Recipients
In July 2017, septic shock developed in 2 patients who 
had received a kidney and 1 patient who had received a 
heart from a common donor. The clinical course of disease, 
antimicrobial drug regimens, and immunosuppressive 
medications for these patients are summarized in Figure 1.
Kidney Recipient 1
The patient was a middle-aged man who had received 
a kidney transplant for IgA nephropathy and focal seg-
mental glomerulosclerosis. Four days after transplan-
tation, fever (39.4°C), hypoxemia, and wheezing de-
veloped. The next day, despite empiric treatment with 
vancomycin and meropenem, disseminated intravascular 
coagulation and septic shock developed, and the patient 
died. The organ procurement organization was alerted 
and immediately notified the physicians for the other 2 
solid organ recipients.
Three days after the patient’s death, small gram-
negative bacilli grew from a blood culture that had been 
collected 4 days after transplantation (Figure 1). Isolate 
characteristics subsequently suggested that it was a pos-
sible organism of bioterrorism (Select Agent); therefore, 
in accordance with American Society for Microbiology 
guidelines (https://www.asm.org/Articles/Policy/Labo-
ratory-Response-Network-(LRN)-Sentinel-Level-C), the 
hospital laboratory discontinued identification procedures 
and referred the isolate to the local public health laboratory, 
a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) biological facility 
(8). Using growth characteristics, biochemical testing, and 
real-time PCR testing, the laboratory presumptively identi-
fied the organism as a Francisella species, notified CDC, 
and sent clinical samples to CDC for characterization.
Kidney Recipient 2
This patient was a woman in her 60s who had received 
a kidney transplant for diabetes mellitus–induced end-
stage renal disease. Four days after transplantation, she 
experienced fever (39.4°C). Clinical samples were col-
lected for culture, and treatment with vancomycin, ceftri-
axone, and metronidazole was empirically initiated. She 
remained febrile, anemia and thrombocytopenia (49,000 
platelets/mm3) developed, and she required mechanical 
ventilation and vasopressor support. Six days after trans-
plantation, after the healthcare team was notified that the 
other kidney recipient had died of sepsis, doxycycline 
was added to the antimicrobial drug regimen. The patient 
eventually recovered.
Seven days after transplantation, gram-negative bacilli 
were isolated from blood and dialysate cultures (Figure 
1). Gram-negative bacilli were also subsequently isolated 
from culture of samples from the peritoneal dialysis cathe-
ter tip and biliary fluid. Clinical samples were transferred to 
the local LRN biological facility and presumptively identi-
fied as a Francisella species (8). An isolate from the blood 
sample was sent to CDC for characterization.
Heart Recipient
The heart recipient was a middle-aged man with a history 
of nonischemic cardiomyopathy. Before transplantation, 
he had received ciprofloxacin and ceftriaxone for recur-
rent Serratia marcescens bacteremia related to an infected 
ventricular assist device. Ciprofloxacin was discontinued 
1 day before transplantation and ceftriaxone the day of 
transplantation. Several hours after transplantation, fever 
(39.1°C), hypotension, and septic shock developed. He re-
ceived vancomycin, meropenem, and cefepime, and fever 
resolved 5 days after transplantation. Results for cultures 
of blood collected during the septic episode, when the 
patient was receiving systemic antimicrobial drugs, were 
negative. Eleven days after transplantation, the clinical 
team was notified that the organ donor possibly had tula-
remia. The patient was empirically administered a 10-day 
course of oral ciprofloxacin and discharged home 27 days 
after transplantation.
Organ Donor
In June 2017, a middle-aged alcoholic man was evaluated 
at an emergency department for obtundation, bloody 
emesis, fever (39.6°C), and respiratory distress. He had 
abruptly ceased alcohol intake 5 days before admission 
and experienced a nonproductive cough, nausea, 
headache, and conjunctivitis 3 days before admission. 
Chest radiographs revealed right upper and lower lobe 
infiltrates (Figure 2). Platelet count was low (108,000/
mm3). Soon thereafter, the patient became hypoxic but did 
not require mechanical ventilation.
The patient was admitted for presumed aspiration pneu-
monia, sepsis, and alcohol withdrawal and administered 
piperacillin/tazobactam, vancomycin, and benzodiazepine. 
Five days later, his fever and mental status temporarily 
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Figure 1. Clinical disease course for Francisella tularensis–infected organ donor and organ recipients, United States, 2017.
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improved, but thrombocytopenia (range 1,000–26,000 
platelets/mm3), bloody emesis, and melena progressively 
worsened. Over 7 days, he received 25 blood product trans-
fusions. Chest radiographs demonstrated worsening inter-
stitial opacities (Figure 2). During the next day, he experi-
enced multiorgan failure and 2 cardiac arrests; 12 days after 
admission, he was declared brain dead.
Results of cultures of the donor’s blood (collected in 
blood culture bottles multiple times during hospitalization), 
urine, endotracheal aspirate, and bronchoalveolar lavage 
were all negative. Computed tomography of the chest 
performed after brain death revealed focal consolidation 
and a 1-cm nodule in the right perihilar region (Figure 
2). Bronchoscopy indicated no abnormalities in the gross 
appearance of the lungs. An autopsy was not performed. 
Results of standard infectious disease testing for organ 
donor eligibility were negative (9). Both kidneys and the 
heart were procured for transplantation.
Methods
We reviewed medical records of the organ donor and recip-
ients and interviewed families and the 2 surviving patients 
about potential exposures to tularemia. In addition, we 
asked the organ donor’s family about the donor’s course of 
illness before hospitalization and illnesses of anyone who 
had been in close contact with him.
Laboratory Testing
Recovered isolates were cultured at CDC on cysteine heart 
agar with 9% chocolatized sheep blood and confirmed as 
F. tularensis by direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) testing. 
DNA was extracted from organ donor and kidney recipient 
cultures and lagomorph bone marrow by using the QIAamp 
DNA MiniKit (QIAGEN, https://www.qiagen.com) and 
tested with real-time TaqMan PCR by using F. tularensis 
multitarget type A and type B assays, then A1 and A2 
subtyping assays (10,11). Serum samples were tested for 
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Figure 2. Radiographs (A, B) and computed tomography (C–E) images of chest of organ donor with Francisella tularensis infection, 
United States, 2017. Computed tomography images were taken after brain death. A) Anteroposterior view with patient in upright position, 
taken on day of admission; B) anteroposterior view with patient in supine position, taken on hospital day 10. C) Small bibasilar pleural 
effusions with adjacent subsegmental atelectasis versus pneumonia in the lower lobes (arrows); D) 3-cm round focus of pneumonia in 
the right lower lobe (arrow); E) 1-cm ill-defined nodule in the inferior right upper lobe (arrow).
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antibodies to F. tularensis by using the microagglutination 
assay (6); we considered a titer of >1:128 to be positive.
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) typing 
of isolates was performed with the PmeI restriction 
enzyme (12) and clustered by using BioNumerics 6.64, 
Dice coefficient, and UPGMA (unweighted pair group 
method with arithmetic mean; Applied Maths, http://
www.applied-maths.com). Whole-genome sequencing 
was performed by using Illumina V2 300 cycle reagents 
(13,14). The genome of each isolate was sequenced 
to an average depth of 311× coverage. To compare the 
isolated strains, we used whole-genome multilocus 
sequence typing (wgMLST) with the F. tularensis A2 
strain WY96-3418 as a reference (GenBank accession 
no. NC_009257·1) (15). In brief, we mapped paired-
end reads from each isolate to the WY96-3418 genome 
sequence and scanned 1,637 gene sequences (1,505,638 
bp) representing 79% of the whole WY96-3418 genome 
(1,898,476 bp) for nucleotide differences by using CLC 
Genomics 10.0 (QIAGEN). Cluster analysis of alleles 
was performed in BioNumerics 7.5 (Applied Maths) by 
using categorical coefficient and UPGMA.
Blood Donor Traceback
To determine whether infection may have been transmit-
ted from an asymptomatic blood donor to the organ donor, 
we investigated the sources of all blood products trans-
fused to the organ donor. Blood donors were asked about 
any potential exposures to tularemia and whether they had 
experienced febrile illness during the 2-week period after 
blood donation. Donors who reported potential exposures 
or febrile illness were tested for F. tularensis by serology.
Environmental Assessment
We investigated the organ donor’s community—including 
the vicinity of the donor’s residence, neighboring homes, 
nearby fields, and a river swimming area—to identify 
animal carcasses or other evidence of recent rodent 
or lagomorph die-off. Presence of potential arthropod 
vectors such as deer flies was noted informally during the 
assessment; however, arthropods were not systematically 
collected as part of the investigation.
We also evaluated the residential water supply as 
a possible source of infection. Records from standard 
municipal water testing results were reviewed, and the 
source well for the donor’s residence was examined for 
evidence of compromise or animal contamination.
Results
Laboratory Tests
Culture, DFA, and PCR 
Testing of archived organ donor blood (collected in acid 
citrate dextrose and EDTA tubes 13 days after admission 
and stored at room temperature) and frozen spleen and 
lymph node tissues (collected 14 days after admission) pro-
duced the following results. Blood samples were negative 
for F. tularensis by PCR and culture (Table). F. tularensis 
was cultured from the spleen tissue; PCR genotyping of 
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Table. Culture and serology results for samples from Francisella tularensis–infected organ donor and organ recipients, United  
States, 2017 
Patient, outcome, samples tested Results 
Donor  
 Blood Culture negative 
 Endotracheal aspirate Culture negative 
 Urine Culture negative 
 Bilateral bronchial washes Culture negative 
 Lymph node, after brain death Culture negative 
 Spleen tissue, after brain death Culture positive for Francisella tularensis 
 Serum, after brain death Serology positive (titer 1:128)* 
Kidney recipient 1, died  
 Blood Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Cerebrospinal fluid, postmortem Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Kidney tissue, postmortem Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Bone marrow, postmortem Culture positive for F. tularensis 
Kidney recipient 2, discharged  
 Blood Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Dialysate Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Biliary fluid Culture positive for F. tularensis 
 Peritoneal dialysis catheter tip Culture positive for F. tularensis 
Heart recipient, discharged  
 Blood Culture negative† 
 Serum Serology negative 
*Antibody titer may be artificially low because of the large volume of blood products and other fluids that the patient received. Presence of a mounted 
immune response, as evidenced by seropositivity, might have contributed to negative culture results in all specimens other than spleen tissue. 
†Before transplantation, the patient received ciprofloxacin and ceftriaxone for bacteremia related to a colonized ventricular assist device. At the time of 
sample collection, the patient had received a final dose of ciprofloxacin the previous day and a final dose of ceftriaxone that morning. Subsequent blood 
cultures were collected while the patient was receiving antimicrobial drugs for presumed sepsis and were negative. 
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the isolate revealed that it was F. tularensis subsp. tular-
ensis (clade A2). Results of DFA and direct PCR testing 
of spleen tissue were negative. No isolate was recovered 
from lymph node tissue. Isolates from kidney recipients 1 
and 2 were confirmed as F. tularensis by DFA testing and 
determined to be F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2) 
by PCR genotyping.
Serologic Findings
Organ donor plasma from the archived EDTA blood 
specimen collected 13 days after admission was positive 
for antibodies to F. tularensis (titer 1:128). A serum sample 
from the heart recipient collected 11 days after transplant 
was negative for F. tularensis antibodies (titer <1:4).
Strain Types
Molecular typing of the F. tularensis A2 strains from 
the donor and both kidney recipients found all 3 to be 
indistinguishable from one another by 2 methods (Figure 
3). PmeI PFGE banding patterns for the 3 strains were the 
same. Comparison of this banding pattern to a larger PFGE 
database of PmeI patterns for A2 strains from throughout 
the western United States (n = 30) demonstrated that the 
pattern was unique. Genome sequencing followed by 
wgMLST analysis revealed no nucleotide differences 
across 1.5 megabases of compared genome sequences 
between the 3 strains.
Blood Donor Traceback Findings
Two blood suppliers provided the blood products trans-
fused to the organ donor. Further blood donation by the 
donors who provided these products was temporarily 
deferred until the traceback and further serologic test-
ing were completed. We identified and interviewed 43 
of the blood donors. A review of blood supplier records 
confirmed that all blood donors met applicable regula-
tions and standards at the time of donation. Telephone 
interviews of donors asked 9 questions specific to F. 
tularensis risk. One donor reported right-sided cervical 
lymphadenopathy; follow-up commercial laboratory test-
ing of blood from this donor was negative for antibodies 
to F. tularensis.
Environmental Assessment Findings
Interviews and medical record reviews of the organ 
recipients and their families revealed no known risk 
factors for tularemia. The organ donor resided on tribal 
lands in the southwestern United States. Family interviews 
revealed no known contact with sick animals, arthropod 
bites, household pets, or other noteworthy exposures. One 
family member reported observing groundhogs and rabbits 
near the donor’s residence but denied any apparent animal 
die-offs. The donor was unemployed and had not traveled 
outside the region for several months before his death.
No deer flies or other arthropod vectors were observed 
near the organ donor’s residence. Two lagomorph 
carcasses were found and collected ≈150 feet and 500 feet 
from the donor’s residence. No organs or soft tissue from 
the carcasses were available for testing; however, PCR 
testing of DNA from femur bone marrow followed by 
genotyping indicated that both lagomorphs were positive 
for F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2).
Maintenance records of the community water source, 
a municipal well and spring, did not indicate a breakdown 
of the chlorination process. Investigation of the well site 
revealed an intact well cover and functioning system with 
no evidence of animal entry.
Discussion
We report human-to-human transmission of tularemia 
by solid organ transplantation. All 3 recipients of organs 
from a common donor with unrecognized tularemia be-
came ill; 1 recipient died. F. tularensis infection in the 
donor and both kidney recipients was confirmed. Use of 
PFGE and wgMLST demonstrated that the F. tularensis 
isolates recovered from the donor and both kidney re-
cipients were indiscernible from each other and distinct 
from other A2 strains, thereby corroborating transmis-
sion of F. tularensis A2 by solid organ transplant. Cli-
nicians and organ procurement organizations evaluating 
potential organ donors who died of an unknown febrile 
illness should carefully assess risk factors for organ 
transplant–transmissible infectious diseases, including 
tularemia, and consider additional diagnostic testing if 
indicated (6,16).
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Figure 3. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and whole-genome multilocus sequence typing (wgMLST) comparisons of Francisella 
tularensis A2 strains. PFGE banding patterns and PFGE and wgMLST cluster analysis are shown for isolates from the organ donor and 
kidney recipients in relation to the F. tularensis A2 reference (strain WY96-3418). Dendrograms indicate percentage strain similarity for 
PmeI PFGE (left) and wgMLST (right).
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The incubation period for naturally acquired tularemia 
is typically 3 to 5 days but can range from 1 to 21 days (7). 
For both kidney recipients, signs of infection developed 4 
days after transplant, and the patients experienced rapidly 
progressive illness. Kidney recipient 2 might have survived 
because of empirically initiated ceftriaxone treatment. 
Ceftriaxone in vitro activity against F. tularensis has been 
demonstrated (17); however, in some cases ceftriaxone has 
been associated with treatment failure (18).
Although sepsis developed in the heart recipient 
several hours after transplantation, F. tularensis infection 
was not identified by culture or serology and would not be 
consistent with such a short incubation period. The episode 
of septic shock shortly after transplant might have been 
related to manipulation and removal of the infected medical 
device. It is possible that pretransplant ciprofloxacin for 
Serratia marcescens or posttransplant cefepime either 
prevented isolation of the organism or prevented F. 
tularensis infection altogether.
Human-to-human transmission of tularemia has been 
clearly documented just one time, in a medical examiner 
who accidentally cut her thumb during autopsy of a person 
who had died of tularemia (19). Another unconfirmed 
report from 1924 described a mother who contracted 
glandular tularemia after pricking her thumb while tending 
a tularemia ulcer on her son’s ear (20). 
Two subspecies of F. tularensis can result in human 
infection: subspecies tularensis (type A) and subspecies 
holarctica (type B) (21). PFGE analyses have further 
classified type A into 2 clades, A1 and A2, which differ in 
geographic distribution and case-fatality rate. A2 infections 
are known to occur only in the western United States, 
including the arid region from the Rocky Mountains west 
to the Sierra Nevada Mountains, matching the geographic 
location of the residence of the organ donor and the F. 
tularensis–positive lagomorph carcasses described in this 
report (11,12).
The organ donor might have been at increased risk for 
tularemia because of his residence on tribal lands. Native 
Americans are disproportionately represented among 
reported cases of tularemia; during 2001–2010, annual 
incidence among Native Americans was nearly 10 times 
higher than that of the general population (0.3 vs. 0.04 
cases/100,000 persons) (2). Previous studies have estimated 
that 7%–17.5% of Native Americans residing in the United 
States and Canada have detectable F. tularensis antibodies 
(22–26). In addition, several outbreaks of tularemia among 
Native Americans have been reported, typically ascribed to 
tickborne infections (26–29).
Clinical and laboratory diagnoses of tularemia 
pose considerable challenges. Pneumonic tularemia, 
in particular, has myriad clinical forms and can mimic 
community-acquired pneumonia or other lung disorders 
(1,7). F. tularensis is not often isolated from blood cultures 
because it is fastidious and slow growing (5,12,21,30). 
For the organ donor reported in this article, blood culture 
sensitivity was probably further limited by neutralizing 
antibodies, given his positive tularemia serology results 
(31). Additional laboratory tests that may aid diagnosis 
include PCR and DFA, although these tests are not 
routinely performed unless disease is clinically suspected. 
Serology may aid diagnosis, although antibody responses 
are generally not detectable until 1–2 weeks after infection 
(1,6). Clinical laboratories must promptly report suspected 
F. tularensis infections to public health laboratories, 
according to LRN guidelines (8).
These findings are subject to limitations. First, the extent 
to which F. tularensis infection contributed to the donor’s 
clinical syndrome or death is unclear. Pulmonary findings 
may have resulted from aspiration pneumonia; gastrointes-
tinal bleeding is not typically associated with tularemia but 
could have been precipitated by sepsis-related disseminated 
intravascular coagulation. In addition, we could not identify a 
specific-exposure source for the donor. However, identifica-
tion of lagomorph carcasses near the donor’s home suggested 
a recent tularemia epizootic, and detection of F. tularensis A2 
in the lagomorph carcasses confirmed presence of this organ-
ism near the donor’s residence.
Generally speaking, recipients’ risks for infection from 
any pathogen must be balanced with the growing shortage 
of organs (32). During the past 2 decades, several emerging 
or uncommon pathogens have been identified as potentially 
transmissible through solid organ transplantation (33,34), 
highlighting the challenges of identifying potentially 
transmissible pathogens in brain-dead organ donors (32). 
These unusual transplant-transmitted infections have 
prompted the addition of more questions on standard 
interviews administered to donors’ next of kin (9) and the 
performance of additional laboratory screening of donors 
at the discretion of organ procurement organizations. Real-
time nucleic acid–based testing and other methods show 
promise for more rapidly and accurately identifying donor 
infections (32). All suspected donor-derived diseases should 
be reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov), as was done in 
this investigation. 
F. tularensis continues to affect public health because 
of ongoing naturally acquired infections, potential to 
cause laboratory-acquired infections, status as a Tier 1 
bioterrorism threat, and newly described human-to-human 
transmission. Clinicians should be aware of the possibility 
of F. tularensis infection in patients receiving organ 
transplants. When evaluating potential organ donors with 
febrile illnesses, clinicians should consider risk factors for 
tularemia such as recent contact with animal carcasses, 
arthropod bites, landscaping activities, residence in a rural 
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area, and white or Native American race (2). If tularemia 
or other infectious diseases are suspected, this suspicion 
should be clearly conveyed to recipient transplant clinicians 
so that vigilant posttransplant clinical surveillance can be 
conducted and timely treatment initiated should a donor-
derived infection occur.
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